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THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
ON THE AwARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IN
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Alaska Civil Rule 82' provides for the assessment of parial2
attorney's fees3 to the prevailing party4 in civil litigation.5 Alaska is
Copyright © 1984 by Alaska Law Review
1. Rule 82(a) of the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
(a) Allowance to Prevailing Party.
(1) Unless the court, in its discretion, otherwise directs, the following
schedule of attorney's fees will be adhered to in fixing such fees for the
party recovering any money judgment therein:
ATroRNEY's FEES IN AVERAGE CASES
Contested Without Trial Non-Contested
First $2,000 25% 20% 15%
Next $3,000 20% 15% 12.5%
Next $5,000 15% 12.5% 10%
Over $10,000 10% 7.5% 5%
Should no recovery be had, attorney's fees for the prevailing party
may be fixed by the court in its discretion in a reasonable amount.
(2) In actions where the money judgment is not an accurate criteria
[sic] for determining the fee to be allowed to the prevailing side, the court
shall award a fee commensurate with the amount and value of legal serv-
ices rendered.
(3) The allowance of attorney's fees by the court in conformance
with the foregoing schedule is not to be construed as fixing the fees be-
tween attorney and client ...
ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82(a) (emphasis added).
2. See ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82(a)(l)-(2). See also Stepanov v. Gavrilovich, 594
P.2d 30, 37 (Alaska 1979) (purpose is to partially compensate party under Rule 82);
Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co., 512 P.2d 575, 588 (Alaska 1973) (the purpose of Alaska
Rule 82 of Civil Procedure is to partially compensate the prevailing party);
Preferred Gen. Agency, Inc. v. Raffetto, 391 P.2d 951, 954 (Alaska 1964) (it is the
purpose of Rule 82 "to partially compensate a prevailing party for the costs to which
he has been put in the litigation .... The rule was not designed to be used capri-
ciously or arbitrarily, or as a vehicle for accomplishing any purpose other than pro-
viding compensation where it is justified.").
3. Two-way fee shifting is involved in Alaska statutes, unlike many statutes
enacted by the federal government. See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (Supp. V 1981) (providing for two-way fee shifting
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the only state in the United States that follows the English rule
which routinely assesses attorney's fees.6 Great discretion is vested
in the trial court to determine whether attorney's fees should be as-
sessed, and, if so, in what amount.7
A judicial exception to this general rule for attorney's fees is
"public interest"8 litigation brought in good faith.9 Under the public
in favor of the party alleging a violation of the Act). See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co.
v. Wilderness Soe'y, 421 U.S. 240, 260-61 & n.33 (1975) (stating the general princi-
ple that attorney's fees are not recoverable absent an express statutory provision for
fees). See generally Note, State Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes.- Are We Quiety Re-
pealing the American Rule?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at -.
The relevance of a one or two-way fee shifting statute is reflected in the impact
that it has on the actions of potential plaintiffs. A one way fee shifting statute in
favor of the plaintiff tends to encourage the bringing of such suits more than a two
way fee shifting provision which carries with it potential liability for the legal fees of
the opposing party. See Rowe, Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at -.
4. An analysis of the definition of prevailing party is beyond the scope of this
note. Prevailing party will refer to the party in the lawsuit who successfully bears
the burden of proof as to his claim or successfully defends against an opposing
party's claim. The party need only prevail on the main issue involved in the lawsuit.
It is not necessary to prevail to the extent of the original claim. See State v. Alaska
Int'l Air, Inc., 562 P.2d 1064, 1067 (Alaska 1977); Buza v. Columbia Lumber Co.,
395 P.2d 511, 514 (Alaska 1964).
5. See generally Note, Award ofAttorney's Fees in Alaska." An Analysis of Rule
82, 4 U.C.L.A.-ALAsKA L. REv. 129 (1974) (history of Rule 82 in Alaska).
6. See Note, supra note 3; cf. Urban Dev. Co. v. DeKreon, 526 P.2d 325, 329
(Alaska 1974)(Rule 82(a) does not require a formal motion for attorney's fees or an
opportunity to be heard. A trial court judge may award attorney's fees as a matter
of course under Rule 82(a)); see also ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82(a)(1) (trial court has
discretion in determining the award of attorney's fees).
7. See, e.g., Froelicher v. Hadley, 442 P.2d 51, 53 (Alaska 1968) (absent an
abuse of discretion, a trial judge's decision regarding attorney's fees will not be over-
ruled); see also ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82(a)(1), supra note 1.
8. "Public interest" is not easily defined. In Anchorage v. McCabe, 568 P.2d
986, 991 (Alaska 1977), the Alaska court looked to La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57
F.R.D. 94, 99-102 (N.D. Cal. 1972), for aid in determining the relevant facts and
circumstances to assess the presence of a public interest. La Raza Unida set forth
the three factors stated infra in text accompanying note 18. La Raza Unida involved
a class action which sought to enjoin the construction of a proposed federal aid
highway. The application of federal statutes and regulations to a state highway
project requiring state compliance with federal environmental laws was analyzed.
The court held that a state project became subject to federal laws upon the approval
of the location of the federal aid highway. Addressing the public interests involved
in the suit, the court considered the following elements in assessing the existence of
a public interest:
a) The effectuation of strong Congressional policies[;]
b) The number of people who have benefited from plaintiffs efforts. ...
[and;]
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interest exception, the prevailing party may receive up to full attor-
ney's fees.' 0 In the event the public interest litigant loses the lawsuit,
he may be excused from paying the attorney's fees of the prevailing
party." This judicially recognized exception was first enunciated in
Gilbert v. State. 12 In Gilbert the court stated that the purpose of the
public interest exception was to "encourage plaintiffs to raise issues
of public interest by removing the awesome financial burden of such
a suit.' 3 The court accepted the view that "awarding fees [to pre-
vailing defendants] in this type of controversy [public interest]
[would] deter citizens from litigating questions of general public con-
cern for fear of incurring the expense of the other party's attorneys'
fees."'14 It held that "it is an abuse of discretion to award attorneys'
fees against a losing party who has in good faith raised a question of
genuine public interest before the courts."' 5 The Alaska public in-
terest exception is, then, a judicial mechanism to encourage plaintiffs
to undertake the risks of public interest litigation and to reward their
c) The necessity, and financial burden, of private enforcement - Be-
cause of the limited resources and potentially conflicting interests within
and among governmental entities, effectuation of the public policies to-
wards environmental protection... frequently depend on private vigi-
lance and enforcement.
57 F.R.D. at 99-100. See Nussbaum,Attorne's Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48
N.Y.U. L. REv. 301, 304-05 (1973).
9. See Gilbert v. State, 526 P.2d 1131, 1136 (Alaska 1974).
10. The recovery of litigation costs, other than attorney's fees, is not within the
scope of this note.
11. See Whitson v. Anchorage, 632 P.2d 232, 233-34 (Alaska 1981) (per curiam)
(court did not award attorney's fees against defendants who raised public interest
claims as a defense; litigants should not be deterred by the prospect of the imposi-
tion of attorney's fees for the opposing party); see also Thomas v. Croft, 614 P.2d
795, 798 (Alaska 1980) (award of attorney's fees was justified because of the inher-
ent equitable power of the court to award fees when justice requires).
12. 526 P.2d 1131, 1136 (Alaska 1974). In Gilbert, a potential political candi-
date sought a declaratory judgment that the state residency statute, which estab-
lished certain durational residency requirements for candidacy, was
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. The court held that there was a com-
pelling state interest for the statute. Thus, the statute did not deny equal protection.
The court determined that the plaintiff had asserted a matter of public interest in
good faith and that it would be an abuse of discretion to assess attorney's fees
against such a plaintiff.
13. See Anchorage v. McCabe, 568 P.2d 986, 990 (Alaska 1977) (emphasis ad-
ded) (relying heavily on Gilbert, 526 P.2d 1131, 1136 (Alaska 1974)). See also Whit-
son v. Anchorage, 632 P.2d at 233-34 (Alaska 1981); Douglas v. Glacier State Tel.
Co., 615 P.2d 580, 594 (Alaska 1980); Moses v. McGarvey, 614 P.2d 1363, 1369
(Alaska 1980); Thomas v. Croft, 614 P.2d 795, 798 (Alaska 1980); Rouse v.
Anchorage School Dist., 613 P.2d 263, 267 (Alaska 1980); Girves v. Kenai Peninsula
Borough, 536 P.2d 1221, 1227 (Alaska 1975).
14. 526 P.2d at 1136.
15. Id See Douglas v. Glacier State Tel. Co., 615 P.2d at 594.
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efforts by relieving them of potential liability for the payment of the
opposing party's attorney's fees.16
Alaska courts have considered three factors to be relevant in the
determination of whether the litigation involved a sufficient public
interest to trigger the public interest exception. These factors, still
used today, 17 are:
(1) the effectuation of strong public policies;
(2) the fact that numerous people received benefits from plain-
tiffs' litigation success; [and]
(3) the fact that only a private party could have been expected to
bring [the] action. 18
In addition to the three factors enumerated above, Alaska
courts have considered a fourth factor. This fourth inquiry asks
whether the litigant claiming public interest status would have had
sufficient economic incentive to bring the lawsuit even if it in-
volved only narrow issues lacking general importance. Such a liti-
gant is less apt than a party lacking this incentive to be deterred
from bringing a good faith claim by the prospect of an adverse
award of attorney's fees. 19
This factor seems to preclude a plaintiff with a substantial economic
stake in the outcome of the litigation from establishing the public
interest character of his lawsuit.20
This note will analyze this factor, hereafter referred to as the
economic incentive factor. The analysis will take place in the con-
text of two recent Alaska Supreme Court decisions, Kenai Peninsula
Borough v. Kenai Peninsula Board of Realtors, Inc. (Board of Real-
tors)21 and Kenai Lumber Co. v. LeResche (Kenai Lumber).22 First,
the analysis will consider the economic incentive factor in conjunc-
tion with the goal of the public interest exception. The problems in
applying the public interest exception will then be discussed. A sug-
16. See La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 102 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (purpose
of public interest exception is not to penalize the losing party, but rather it is to
further the promotion of strong policies) (case relied on to formulate the relevant
factors in Anchorage v. McCabe, 568 P.2d at 991).
17. See supra note 13.
18. Anchorage v. McCabe, 568 P.2d 991 (Alaska 1977) (citing La Raza Unida v.
Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1972)). See Nussbaum, supra note 8, at 304-05.
19. Kenai Lumber Co. v. LeResche, 646 P.2d 215, 223 (Alaska 1982).
20. In Gilbert, 526 P.2d at 1136, the court stated that the economic benefit con-
ferred or potentially conferred upon the litigant may or could be a factor in the
determination of the existence of a sufficient public interest in the litigation; but the
economic interest of the litigant was by no means elevated to a separate and identifi-
able factor, equivalent in importance to the other factors, such as the general public
benefit, strong public policy, and expectation that only a private party could have
brought the suit.
21. 652 P.2d 471 (Alaska 1982).
22. 646 P.2d 215 (Alaska 1982).
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gested method of analysis for public interest litigation will be offered
using Board of Realtors and Kenai Lumber as vantage points. Sec-
ond, the ramifications of the economic incentive factor on potential
public interest litigants, counsel, and lower courts will be discussed.
II. THE ECONOMIC INCENTIVE FACTOR IN CONTEXT
A. Kenai Peninsula Borough v. Kenai Peninsula Board of Realtors,
Inc.
Board of Realtors involved a city ordinance which allowed land
to be subdivided into parcels of ten acres or more without presenta-
tion of the proposed plat to the State Planning Commission. The
ordinance directly confficted with an Alaska statute that required
prior approval of proposed plats by the State Planning Commis-
sion.23 A title insurer brought suit alleging that the ordinance was
invalid. The court held that the plaintiff had sufficient standing to
challenge the validity of the ordinance.24 The basis for standing was
the plaintiffs substantial economic interest in the outcome. The trial
court noted that the plaintiff
is a business corporation in the business of issuing policies of title
23. ALASKA STAT. § 40.15.010 (1971) provides:
Before the lots or tracts of any subdivision or dedication may be sold or
offered for sale, the subdivision or dedication shall be submitted for ap-
proval to the authority having jurisdiction, as prescribed in this chapter.
The regular approval of the authority shall be shown on it or attached to it
and the subdivision or dedication shall be filed for record in the office of
the recorder. The recorder shall not accept a subdivision or dedication for
filing unless it shows this approval. If no platting authority exists as pro-
vided in §§ 70-130 of this chapter, lands may be sold without approval.
24. Standing is a matter of who may properly raise a particular claim. It is
based on the litigant's personal stake in the outcome which may have arisen out of
threatened harm to the plaintiff or harm already suffered by the plaintiff. See, e.g.,
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),
412 U.S. 669, 686-90 (1973); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103-06 (1968).
A finding of standing differs from the determination of a plaintiffs economic
incentives and the consequent effect of these incentives on his public interest status.
The public interest exception requirement that only a private plaintiff would be
expected to bring the suit implicitly assumes that such a private plaintiff possesses
the requisite standing to sue. In practice, the kind of injury or potential harm likely
to encourage most civil suits is economic. These economic incentives may, there-
fore, be required for a finding of sufficient standing to sue; simultaneously, pursuant
to the economic incentive factor, they may be the very aspect of the plaintiff's law-
suit that precludes public interest status. It may be difficult to determine when a
given plaintiff has sufficient standing to bring suit, but too much of an interest to be
entitled to public interest status. Furthermore, unlike the other factors, such as
breadth of impact (which deals with the effect of the litigation) and the effectuation
of strong policies (which deals with the substance of the litigation), the economic
factor is inextricably intertwined with another concern, the standing requirement;
yet they represent purportedly separate considerations in the court's analysis.
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insurance on real property. If the invalid ordinance were allowed
to stand, [the plaintiff] would be harmed in that it would have to
forego issuing policies of title insurance because of potentially in-
valid titles or write the policies and risk the consequences.25
It is clear from this statement that the court was cognizant of the
plaintiff's economic incentives for bringing suit.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alaska stated that the "ordi-
nance quite plausibly would harm [the plaintiffs] economic interests.
The ambiguous and uncertain property descriptions which would
probably occur with greater frequency under the ordinance could
substantially increase [the plaintiffs] burden in determining titles
and its exposure to liability. These interests are economic." 26 The
Alaska Supreme Court affirmed both the trial court's determination
that a sufficient public interest was presented and the award of full
attorney's fees to the plaintiff as prevailing party in the suit.2
7
Board of Realtors illustrates the court's unwillingness to apply
the economic incentive factor. Clearly, the plaintiff in Board of Real-
tors faced enormous potential economic liability in the event that
the ordinance was upheld; in fact, the court expressly recognized this
economic interest. Yet, the court found that a public interest was
involved, thereby excepting the plaintiff from the general rule for
attorney's fees, and entitling the plaintiff to full attorney's fees. This
holding is contrary to the apparent scope and purpose of the eco-
nomic incentive factor, which is to preclude a finding of public inter-
est status where the litigant is unlikely to be deterred from initiating
the lawsuit because of his substantial economic motivations. 28
B. Kenai Lumber Co. v. LeResche
In Kenai Lumber,29 a timber company brought suit asserting
that material modifications and amendments were made to a timber
harvesting contract. The plaintiff was not a party to the contract, but
was a competitor of a party to the contract. The complaint alleged
that the amendments to the timber harvesting contract constituted
significant changes which should have been bargained for through
Alaska's statutory competitive bidding process. 30 The Supreme
25. Board of Realtors, 652 P.2d at 472 (Alaska 1982) (quoting from the trial
court).
26. Id at 472-73 (emphasis added).
27. Id at 473.
28. See generally supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
29. 646 P.2d 215 (Alaska 1982).
30. See ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.120 (1977) which provides:
Disposal procedure. Timber and other materials shall be sold either by
sealed bids or public auction, depending on which method is determined
by the commissioner to be in the best interests of the state, to the highest
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Court of Alaska affirmed both the trial court's holding that no public
interest litigation was involved and its award of attorney's fees to the
prevailing defendant. The court focused on the competitive advan-
tage it felt the plaintiff had sought through the litigation, an advan-
tage which constituted a substantial economic incentive for initiating
the lawsuit. The court expressly stated that plaintiff "was a competi-
tor of [the defendant] and was seeking a continuing source of timber
to process in its mill."3 1 Therefore, "'[b]ecause the sums at stake in
[the] controversy [were] large enough to prompt a suit without con-
sideration of the public interest, the superior court could have con-
cluded that the property owners were acting in their private interests
and not in behalf of the public.' "32
In Kenai Lumber the economic incentive factor was clearly uti-
lized to preclude a finding that public interest litigation was in-
volved. The court focused almost exclusively on the competitive
relationship between the parties.33 The court implicitly assumed that
if parties are commercial competitors, then the public interest must
not be involved. This holding appears to be consistent with the
scope and purpose of the economic incentive factor. The rationale of
the opinion, however, is a non sequitur: public interest litigation is
not necessarily precluded by the parties' competitive relationship.
The difficulty presented by both Board of Realtors and Kenai
Lumber is twofold. First, the court did not consistently analyze the
character of the claims made. Second, the court sporadically applied
the economic incentive factor. Several questions are suggested by
these varying analyses by the same court. For instance, what is the
role of the economic incentive factor in the analysis of the "public
qualified bidder as determined by the director. An aggrieved bidder may
appeal to the commissioner within five days after the sale for a review of
the director's determination. The sale shall be conducted by the director
or his representative, and at the time of sale the successful bidder shall
deposit the amount specified in the terms of sale. The means by which the
amount of deposit is determined shall be prescribed by appropriate regula-
tion. The director or his representative shall immediately issue a receipt
containing a description of the timber or materials purchased, the price
bid, and the terms of sale. The receipt shall be acknowledged in writing by
the bidder. A contract of sale, on a form approved by the attorney general,
shall be signed by the purchaser and, following the approval of the com-
missioner, the contract shall be signed by the director on behalf of the
state. The director, with the approval of the commissioner, may impose
conditions, limitations, and terms which he considers necessary and proper
to protect the interests of the state. Violation of any provision of this chap-
ter or the terms of the contract of sale subjects the purchaser to appropriate
legal action.
31. 646 P.2d at 223.
32. Id (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Local Boundary Comm'n, 518 P.2d 92, 104
(Alaska 1974)).
33. 646 P.2d at 223.
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interest" character of the controversy? Is the economic incentive of
the party equally weighed with the other three relevant factors enu-
merated by the court? Is the consideration of economic incentives
dispensable merely upon judicial discretion, as appeared to be the
case in Board of Realtors; and, if so, what are the telltale signs of
such dispensability? Is the general goal to encourage public interest
litigation promoted by the analysis of the court in Board of Realtors
and Kenai Lumber?
Furthermore, the policy behind the public interest exception is
the encouragement of public interest litigation. The relatively recent
enunciation of the economic incentive factor, however, introduces
much uncertainty into the determination of whether a plaintiff's suit
possesses the requisite public interest character to fall within the
public interest exception to attorney's fees. This uncertainty arises
from the broad discretion granted to trial courts and the concomitant
lack of clear guidelines for the application of the relevant factors in
determining the existence or nonexistence of a public interest claim.
A better method of analysis than that used in KenaiLumber and
Board of Realtors would be to rest the determination of public inter-
est status on objective criteria which would consistently form the
framework of analysis. Such an analysis would effectuate the goals
of encouraging public interest litigation and of providing useful
guidelines for litigants seeking to initiate public interest lawsuits.
III. THE ECONOMIC INCENTIVE FACTOR AND THE GOAL OF THE
PUBLIC INTEREST EXCEPTION
The provision for two-way attorney fee shifting, whether statu-
torily or judicially created, may reflect several different underlying
goals.34 First, it may reflect a desire to compensate the prevailing
party, thereby recognizing that certain wrongdoings warrant partial
or full recovery of attorney's fees. Second, assessing attorney's fees
against the losing party can increase deterrence of certain conduct
through the establishment of a risk of payment of the prevailing
party's attorney's fees. Third, awarding attorney's fees in areas in-
volving private interests may reflect a policy choice to encourage
lawsuits in areas where special incentives may be necessary to
prompt plaintiffs to action - for instance, securities fraud and civil
rights actions. Fourth, it may reflect a desire to promote the vindica-
tion of public rights involving matters of broad social impact. This
goal reflects the view that a plaintiff should be encouraged to benefit
the community through his actions. 35 Alaska courts have stated that
34. See generally Rowe, The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Sh[fming. A Critical
Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651.
35. See id at 663 n.56.
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this goal, to encourage public interest litigation, is the one underly-
ing the Alaska public interest exception.36 Fifth, it may reflect a de-
sire to encourage uneconomical litigation that benefits the public.
This lattermost goal suggests a significantly narrower scope than the
broader fourth possible goal. It seeks only to encourage plaintiffs
who might not otherwise have a sufficient economic interest at stake
and to prompt their actions to bring suit. The goals to be served by
an award of partial or full attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff can
be summarized as follows: compensating prevailing parties, deter-
ring certain conduct, creating special incentives for particular kinds
of litigation, encouraging public interest lawsuits, and encouraging
only uneconomical public interest litigation.
It is crucial to ascertain which of these fee shifting goals is con-
sistent with the Alaska public interest exception. Once that is ascer-
tained, it is possible to assess whether application of the four factors
that determine public interest status is consistent with the fulfillment
of the stated goal. This determination is important because a specific
goal indicates which actions are necessary to fulfill it. Only when
both the goal and implementing actions are harmonized can the
stated goal be achieved.37
Alaska courts have stated that promoting lawsuits which benefit
the public is the goal behind the Alaska public interest exception.38
36. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
37. For an analogous situation, consider the various goals within the criminal
justice system of retribution, deterrence, and vindication of the public interest.
Given these goals, it can be expected that a prosecutor would be likely to undertake
enforcement measures consistent with the fulfillment of these overall goals. Reha-
bilitation or other diversions from criminal sanctions, therefore, would not be ex-
pected to be the desired end in such a criminal justice system. Furthermore, assume
that certain prosecutorial decisionmaking reflects a conscious concentration of effort
to stringently enforce the laws against murder, rape, and drug offenses. The under-
lying goal in this instance, in addition to the general goals previously stated, would
be to prevent such conduct by punishing the criminal whose conduct was felt to
result in the irreparable harm to the public welfare. One would expect that the
fulfillment of this policy would be manifest in frequent prosecutions, multiple
charging of offenses and related offenses with resulting consecutive sentencing, and
a paucity of plea bargaining opportunities for defendants charged with the commis-
sion of these crimes. As a consequence of these goals and of limited resources, the
enforcement of less violent offenses, such as mail fraud or other white collar crimes,
may be less diligent. The stringent enforcement of particularly heinous crimes,
therefore, may reflect the underlying enforcement policy which embodies the im-
plicit assumption that the commission of other crimes is not as immediately detri-
mental to the public welfare.
38. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. In determining what constitutes
a public interest, the Alaska Supreme Court might pursue several goals. Even if
several goals are apparent, however, a clarification of exactly what those goals are
would still be manifestly useful to guide practitioners, future plaintiffs, and lower
courts.
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Consequently, one would expect that court decisions would manifest
a desire to encourage such litigation. The application of the eco-
nomic incentive factor, however, is inconsistent with the encourage-
ment of public interest lawsuits because an economic interest is not
necessarily inconsistent with the presence of a public interest con-
cern. The goal to encourage public interest litigation would be best
promoted by clearly focusing on the goal to promote public interest
litigation in general, adhering to the stated goal, and defining the
scope of the public interest itself in conjunction with the stated
goal.39
The economic motivations of the plaintiff may be relevant in
determining the sufficiency of the public interest involved. However,
the proper role of the plaintiff's economic incentives is within a sub-
set of factors to be considered in determining the presence or ab-
sence of a sufficient public interest.40 A strong economic interest
39. If it is assumed that the goal behind the public interest exception was lim-
ited to simply encouraging the bringing of uneconomical litigation, the scope of the
goal of the public interest exception would be markedly narrowed. Perhaps only the
altruistic plaintiff would appropriately fall within the ambit of the public interest
exception, given this limited purpose. The goal and operation of the public interest
exception, as narrowed, would be similar to the general policy behind attorney fee
shifting in Alaska for all other civil cases: partial compensation of the prevailing
party. Thus, if the goal were simply to compensate, there would be no justification
for the public interest exception, because compensation is the current purpose be-
hind general attorney fee shifting in Alaska. Compensation, therefore, cannot be the
purpose underlying the public interest exception because Alaska courts have con-
sistently stated that the goal of the public interest exception is to encourage public
interest litigation. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. Assuming that
encouragement is the ultimate goal, it does not make sense to rest the ultimate char-
acterization of the suit on the economic incentives of the parties.
40. The court's focus on the economic incentives of the parties may reflect a
concern that the public interest exception not be broadened to the extent that nearly
every claim is amenable to the definition of public interest. Some balancing of in-
terests is necessary. The goal, however, of encouraging public interest litigation is
better served by permitting some of the more questionable cases to be classified as
public interest litigation, rather than by precluding such suits because of potential or
assumed economic incentives. In developing the relevant factors to determine pub-
lic'interest status, the court should err on the side of vindicating the public interest.
An analogy to prior restraints on free speech may be drawn; once it is recog-
nized that the goal is free speech, the question remains as to how great an effort will
be made to assure that the understood goal is fulfilled. The evil in a prior restraints
statute is that too broad a category of speech may be precluded because of the
"chill" created by the possibility of punishment. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (Minnesota statute that allowed abatement of de-
rogatory publications was struck down as an unconstitutional prior restraint on free
speech violative of the fourteenth amendment). The same reasoning, albeit not ris-
ing to the level of a constitutional inquiry, is applicable to attorney fee shifting.
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may indeed militate against the litigation being appropriately char-
acterized as public interest litigation. Economic incentives, however,
are not appropriately considered as a separate and identifiable
fourth factor which may singly preclude public interest status.41 Nor
should the economic incentives of the party create so much uncer-
tainty that they are allowed to frustrate the overall goal to encourage
public interest litigation. While economic incentivies may be rele-
vant, they should not be a controlling factor in assessing public inter-
est status.
The court should thoroughly scrutinize the definition of public
interest instead of focusing on the individual plaintiff. If a sufficient
public interest is vindicated by the litigation, the individual circum-
stances of the litigant should be overshadowed. 42 If the paramount
objective is to encourage public interest litigation, the existence of
economic incentives, as in Board of Realtors and Kenai Lumber,
does not require the conclusion that the public does not benefit. Nor
does it mean that litigating the controversy is not in the public's best
interest.43 If the aim is to encourage litigation to resolve important
issues of public concern, it is nonsensical to deny public interest sta-
tus simply because a lucrative economic issue is presented by a
plaintiff.44 To allow the economic incentives of the plaintiff to be-
come the controlling factor in the determination of whether the suit
41. See supra note 20.
42. Consider public interest plaintiffs with "sure winner" cases. As in the case
in which litigants have strong economic incentives, they do not need much encour-
agement to pursue "sure winner" cases. Yet, this "sure winner" incentive does not
preclude an award of attorney's fees. Precluding one plaintiff with economic incen-
tives, but not another with a "sure winner" case, discriminates against the public
interest plaintiff.
43. In fact, private litigation may be a relatively inexpensive means to enforce
laws enacted for the public's benefit and to improve the quality of the laws enacted.
44. It may be possible to incorporate a public interest issue into an otherwise
relatively narrow civil claim. For example, a contract claim arising under a state
law requiring competitive bidding may be brought in conjunction with a claim con-
cerning the validity of the statute. If the plaintiff can be encouraged to raise the
public interest question simultaneously with his contract claim it may be feasible to
recognize the gain to society from the litigation and concurrently encourage the
plaintiff to undertake the extra research required to raise the public interest ques-
tion. Thus, when an important public policy question may conveniently be consoli-
dated into the litigation but for the economic incentive factor, the additional
expense associated with preparing the public interest claim would be warranted.
The court should not overlook this possible avenue to vindicate important public
policies.
In addition, it would be possible to determine what portion of the case involved
the public interest issue and to apportion the award of attorney's fees accordingly,
instead of applying the all-or-nothing rule currently adhered to by the courts, i.e., it
either is or is not public interest litigation. Certainly the broad discretion of the
courts would countenance such a system. See, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 S. Ct.
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is public interest litigation dispenses with the three most relevant fac-
tors: the breadth of impact, vindication of strong social policies, and
the personal standing of the plaintiff.45
A. Practical Difficulties in Applying the Economic Incentive
Factor
A practical difficulty that may arise with the application of the
economic incentive factor is that it may in fact discourage litigation
of public interest issues by creating an additional barrier - in-
creased uncertainty surrounding public interest status. Now the po-
tential public interest litigant must ask himself whether he has so
great an economic stake in the outcome of the litigation that he will
be subjected to payment of the attorney's fees of the prevailing party.
This uncertainty undermines the objective of encouraging public in-
terest litigation.
The impact of the economic incentive factor on litigants should
also be viewed in conjunction with the other three factors.46 The
greatest difficulty in applying all four factors arises in the concomi-
tant application of the third and fourth factors. The fact that a pri-
vate party is expected to bring the suit suggests that he has some
motivation for initiating suit. Often this motivation is economic.
Because a plaintiff must possess an interest significant enough to
confer standing, the question remains as to how great an interest will
exceed the economic incentive limits. The economic incentive factor
is difficult to mesh with the application of the third factor because it
imposes a limit on how much interest the plaintiff can possess. Thus,
even though the gain to society from the litigation may be great, the
application of the economic incentive factor suggests that if the gain
to the plaintiff is correspondingly great, the economic circumstances
of the plaintiff will be controlling and will preclude public interest
status.
Assessing a party's economic incentives to ascertain the public
interest character of the litigation presents another practical prob-
lem. The court must consider the motives of the parties, motives
which can be measured only by subjective determinations. The eco-
nomic incentive factor necessarily implies delving into the subjective
1933 (1983) (relevant factors in determining the proportional award of attorney's
fees).
45. Furthermore, without this economic incentive the plaintiff may not possess
the requisite standing to bring suit. The reasoning of the court in this area suggests
that the public interest plaintiff stands between Scylla and Charybdis, for he must
possess the requisite personal interest to have standing to sue; but too great a per-
sonal stake in the outcome is fatal to the public interest character of the lawsuit
because of the economic incentive factor. See supra note 24.
46. See supra text accompanying note 18.
[Vol. 1:189
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION
motives of the parties and calculating potential economic recoveries
which may have prompted the party to bring suit.47 Neither the mo-
tives nor the possible rewards, however, can be effectively explored
in court. Furthermore, as a matter of logic, encouraging public in-
terest litigation does not apriori require the court to probe into the
economic incentives of the parties.
In addition, the analyses in the two Alaska Supreme Court
opinions discussed earlier in this note are unclear. Two alternative
rationales could possibly support the court's holdings. First, the
court could have reasoned that no public interest was involved be-
cause only a private interest with too limited an impact on the public
was implicated (a rationale which solely addresses the quantum of
public interest). Alternatively, the court could have reasoned that a
public interest may be involved, but that it was not the motivating
force behind the litigation because the suit would have been brought
anyway (a rationale which addresses the economic motives). This
latter rationale is problematic because it relies on the subjective and
unarticulated motives underlying the plaintifrs conduct. It also sug-
gests that short shrift is given to the other relevant factors: the im-
pact of the lawsuit on the community, the effectuation of strong
public policies, and the recognition that only a private party could
have been expected to initiate the action. Instead of leaving the in-
terpretation of the court's analysis to guesswork, the Alaska court
should clearly articulate the rationale for its decisions so that that
rationale can be consistently and logically applied.
B. Suggested Analysis for Public Interest Status
A better analytical approach to follow in determining the public
interest character of the litigation would be to focus on only three
factors - the breadth of impact, the effectuation of strong public
policies, and the likelihood that only a private party would bring the
action.48 The court should articulate which strong public policies
47. The problem is accentuated when economic incentives are more attenuated.
For instance, in a ballot access case a plaintiff may have economic incentives to
attain a powerful political office. A strong public interest in having an open and
free election process may concurrently exist. In this instance, there would be an
inherent inconsistency in denying public interest status to the plaintiff who chal-
lenges the political election statute. A similar fact situation was resolved in favor of
granting public interest status in Gilbert, 526 P.2d 1131 (Alaska 1974). Yet, the ex-
tent of the economic incentive test remains unclear. Virtually all litigation involves
some economic incentive; given the commonality of this occurrence how useful can
the economic incentive test ever be?
48. The third factor addresses both the appropriateness of the particular plain-
tiff initiating the lawsuit (standing) and the preferred method of litigation (private
suit). It is not addressed here because it is more a matter of procedure than a matter
which affects thepublic interest character of the litigation. Thus, out of the three
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would be promoted by the litigation. To ascertain what matters are
of broad public concern, the Alaska court may look to other jurisdic-
tions, state and federal, which have enacted statutes providing for
the award of attorney's fees. 49 For example, various federal statutes
allow attorney's fees in areas such as civil rights,5 0 unfair competi-
tion,5' public health and welfare,52 securities fraud violations,5 3 and
environmental law.54 These statutes focus on the social benefit aris-
ing from the litigation of disputes in these areas. Similarly, Alaska
courts should consider the breadth of impact of the litigation as the
paramount question in evaluating the nature of the litigation. Once
this impact is determined, the court can ascertain whether the litiga-
tion serves the public interest. Eliminating the economic incentive
factor clarifies the analysis and treats the effectuation of strong pub-
lic policies as the highest goal to be served by the public interest
exception.
In addition, the advantage of using only the three factors is that
each is more objective than the economic incentive factor. The court
can rule without making subjective determinations about the liti-
gant's possible economic motives or subjective mental state. For in-
stance, in Board of Realtors the court should have utilized the
objective factors and expressly considered the breadth of impact of
the litigation and the vindication of a substantial public interest in
maintaining clear land titles.5 5 The court should have recognized
the nominal interest of the plaintiff in relation to the aggregate po-
tential injury to all future landholders who paid for and relied on the
title insurance provided by plaintiff. The court could have identified
a strong public policy for avoiding unnecessary litigation, recogniz-
ing that such an invalid ordinance was likely to open the floodgates
of litigation. A breadth of impact analysis could have supported the
court's decision. This analysis would have clearly communicated to
factors, the role of the third factor in determining public interest status is viewed as
subordinate to the other considerations of breadth of impact and overall social ben-
efit of the litigation.
49. See generally E. LARSON, FEDERAL COURT AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
301-12 (1981); PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, PUBLIC INTEREST PRACTICE AND FEE
AWARDS (H. Newberg ed. 1980).
50. See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 (Supp. V 1981).
51. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1982).
52. See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2072-73 (1982); Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976).
53. See, e.g., Securities Excha-nge Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1982).
54. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1976);
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(4)
(1976); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (Supp. V 1981).
55. See supra text accompanying notes 23-28.
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potential plaintiffs the basis on which the court's decision rested.
Thus, these broad public policies supported a finding in favor of
plaintiff's public interest status in Board of Realtors. Any of these
policies may have been, but was not, articulated by the court to jus-
tify plaintiffs public interest status. An unequivocal recognition of
the broad public interests at stake in Board of Realtors would have
supported a determination that the presence of these factors out-
weighed the plaintiff's economic incentives and entitled him to pub-
lic interest status.
Similarly, in Kenai Lumber the court could have justified its de-
cision without consideration of the economic incentive factor. The
court could have determined that no public interest was involved in
that the contract modifications were minor, hence insignificant in the
statutory context.56 Alternatively, the court could have held that the
litigation lacked the breadth of impact reflective of a genuine public
concern in that it involved only the rights of three private parties.
The court could have characterized the suit as one that involved tra-
ditionally personal and private interests, akin to tort,57 child sup-
port,58 and child custody59 proceedings. These proceedings have too
attenuated an impact on the general social welfare to be deemed
matters of public interest. Finally, the court could have focused on
the language of the statute60 which grants the Commissioner discre-
tion regarding contract provisions and methods of sale. The court
could have deemed that the contract modification issue had already
been scrutinized by the Commissioner; hence, implicitly, the public's
interests had already been served. Once again, the economic incen-
tive factor was an unnecessary consideration which needlessly ob-
scured and complicated the court's analysis.
IV. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC INCENTIVE FACTOR
A. The Impact on Potential Public Interest Plaintiffs
If the goal of the public interest exception is to encourage litiga-
tion concerning important public interests, uncertainty surrounding
the determination of public interest status can have several detri-
56. See supra text accompanying notes 29-33.
57. Hiller v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 671 P.2d 369, 374 (Alaska 1983) (tort
claim alleging defects in a snowmobile was not a matter involving the public
interest).
58. Cooper v. State, 638 P.2d 174, 179 (Alaska 1981) (when parent challenged a
child-in-need-of-aid petition, the court held that any purported public interest was
too attenuated where the parent only sought to vindicate her own interests, and not
to benefit the public).
59. Id
60. See ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.120 (1977) set out supra note 30.
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mental effects. First, it may discourage public interest plaintiffs from
initiating meritorious public interest suits because of this uncertainty
and the consequent risk of payment of the opposing party's attor-
ney's fees. The Alaska Supreme Court has recognized that the risk of
paying attorney's fees to the opposing party significantly deters the
initiation of public interest litigation.6' Moreover, the cost to a po-
tential plaintiff is not merely measured in terms of the opponent's
attorney's fees. Public interest plaintiffs may also expend great
amounts of time and effort, neglect their businesses, and encounter
the stresses which accompany any litigation. These additional costs
also deter public interest plaintiffs from initiating suit. If the court
deems it necessary to scrutinize the economic incentives of the plain-
tiffs, it should also assess the practical costs of litigation. To do
otherwise is analogous to calculating the profits of a corporation
without considering the expense of generating those profits. By em-
phasizing the financial motives of the plaintiff, the court obscures the
real issue presented by the litigation; that is, the public interest in-
quiry. In addition, the analysis exaggerates the true economic inter-
est possessed by the plaintiff by ignoring the costs of litigation.
Another effect of this uncertainty about what does and does not
constitute a matter of public interest is that plaintiffs may be en-
couraged to bring a number of unworthy non-public interest claims.
The purpose of these suits would be to test the boundaries of the
public interest exception. Such suits appear to be justifiable at pres-
ent because the court's application of the relevant factors to deter-
mine public interest status is confusing. A plethora of such
"unworthy" cases may be routinely filed, resulting in an unnecessary
backlog of cases.
B. The Iiapact on Counsel
The uncertainty generated by the economic incentive factor
makes it difficult for counsel to advise potential public interest plain-
tiffs. Rendering advice becomes a "hit or miss" approach, with coun-
sel often able to find abundant case law to support either side of the
controversy. Counsel is thus unable to accurately assess the character
of the client's claim. This uncertainty results in an unnecessary
waste of resources. Many unnecessary appeals may result because
plaintiffs counsel is unsure of the criteria used by the court to deter-
mine public interest status. The court's energies are wasted, its dock-
et is strained, and years may elapse. The practitioner's everyday
decisionmaking can be greatly facilitated by court opinions that
clearly state the relevant factors considered and the objective ration-
61. See generally supra note 11.
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ale used by the court. This would also promote the efficiency and
integrity of the legal system.
C. The Impact on the Lower Courts and Judicial Discretion
Finally, even if there were no immediate effect on potential
public interest plaintiffs, the lack of clear standards will mean that
attorney fee issues will continue to be one of the most litigated ques-
tions in the Alaska courts because they are a matter of practical sig-
nificance in every lawsuit. The number of public interest claims may
well continue to increase, thereby compounding the problem. While
it is recognized that the award of attorney's fees is a discretionary
matter for the court, and thus by nature does not suggest any bright
line test, a modicum of guidance could be provided. The analysis
underlying this discretion can be useful, if explained, to counsel. It
is to be hoped that as a result of this guidance that relatively consis-
tent results can be reached by the court given similar facts and
circumstances. 62
Uncertain guidelines for the application of the economic incen-
tive factor may have an impact on the overall notion of judicial dis-
cretion. Without guidelines for the lower courts, their decisions
regarding public interest status may frequently be reversed. These
reversals could suggest that lower courts do not, in fact, possess the
discretion granted by the Alaska attorney's fees rule.63 Guidelines
from the Supreme Court of Alaska would enable the lower courts to
exercise their discretion consistently, thereby eliminating many per-
haps unnecessary and unwarranted appeals.
In addition, the number of cases involving public interest litiga-
tion would almost certainly be reduced in the long term by providing
more guidance. Greater guidance could shorten each trial by ex-
cluding consideration of clearly nonpublic interest allegations and
by deterring altogether the making of unfounded allegations. It is
suggested that "no effect" on the current state of affairs is manifestly
unsatisfactory because unnecessary litigation can be avoided by pro-
viding more objectively ascertainable standards to judge the pres-
ence or absence of a public interest claim.
A possible procedural alternative64 for dealing with the confu-
62. Inconsistency in the application of the factors can be expected to be commu-
nicated to the public. The current case law may suggest to the public that the court
operates without method; this message may discourage the initiation of public inter-
est lawsuits.
63. See ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82(a).
64. Another possible alternative, if the judiciary simply seeks to encourage un-
economical litigation involving the public interest, would be for the legislature to
place a cap on the amount that is recoverable in public interest litigation. But for
the legislature to make predictions of favorable economic stakes is precarious since
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sion surrounding public interest status would be to allow a pretrial
determination by the court of the public interest status of the liti-
gants, the breadth of impact of the litigation, and the propriety of the
suit being brought by the plaintiff.65 A pretrial decision could aid
parties in their preparation of proof of public interest status. It could
also result in less work for the court during trial by eliminating spec-
ulation about economic incentives and by providing a concrete rec-
ord for appeal of all relevant facts. Another advantage of a pretrial
determination is that possibly incorrect determinations about the im-
pact of the litigation or about the parties' possible economic incen-
tives could be avoided. The pretrial determination would enable the
court to consider the ramifications of the lawsuit outside the hectic
pace of trial. A thoughtful and unhurried analysis of the impact of
the litigation would be possible. Thus, the objective of this pretrial
determination would be to screen out clearly nonpublic interest law-
suits as soon as possible. A more efficient judicial system would re-
sult in that the consideration of such issues could be dealt with early
on. This alternative may also discourage the making of such claims
when they are neither useful for stalling tactics, settlement negotia-
tions, nor potential reimbursement based on uncertain case law.
V. CONCLUSION
If the goal of the public interest exception to attorney's fees
awards is to encourage public interest litigation, unnecessary uncer-
tainty is created by focusing on the economic incentives of the plain-
tiffs. The definition and scope of public interest litigation should be
more articulately defined and evaluated. This suggested analysis
recognizes that the economic incentives of a party, while relevant,
are not entitled to paramount and controlling consideration if a true
underlying public interest is involved in the litigation. The court
should recognize that the existence of a substantial economic interest
is not necessarily inconsistent with the public interest character of
the litigation. The focus should be on the public interest character of
the litigation - its overall impact on society - and not on the un-
derlying motives of the plaintiff - motives which are inherently sub-
jective and about which only arbitrary determinations can be made.
the amount involved in the litigation is frequently unknown. Furthermore, the
amount involved is often impossible to determine before judgment is entered, and at
best, only a general standard could be implemented which would only arbitrarily
serve the needs of the public.
65. It is recognized that a favorable determination regarding public interest sta-
tus may encourage litigants to exert all efforts and, therefore, maximize costs to
litigate the issues. Pursuant to the court's broad discretion, however, the recovery of
attorney's fees could always be limited to a reasonable amount. This oversight func-
tion should prevent overexpenditures for legal fees.
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While the exercise of judicial discretion is expressly provided
for by rule66 and is a necessary element in an area concerned with
notions of the reasonableness of compensation, its use without ac-
companying guidelines seriously hinders the precedential value of
Alaska court opinions. Unarticulated and unexplained discretion
leads to confusion in applying the relevant factors. Before the public
interest exception was declared, a considerable financial risk existed
for plaintiffs initiating public interest lawsuits. This risk existed be-
cause of the possibility of paying attorney's fees; it existed regardless
of the degree to which their claims promoted public interests. Such a
state of affairs is incompatible with the recognized goal not to deter
potential public interest litigants from bringing suit by the risk of
payment for the opposing party's attorney's fees.67
Furthermore, this situation makes plaintiffs unsure of the public
interest nature of their claims. Therefore, they may bring suit to test
the boundaries of the public interest exception. Unnecessary appeals
based on public interest characterizations made by the trial court
may follow almost as a matter of course. Inevitably, lower court de-
cisions involving public interest issues will be reversed. This se-
quence of events suggests that the discretion of the lower courts
involving attorney fee awards is not as broad as imagined. Thus,
lower courts would benefit from a more thorough articulation by the
Supreme Court of Alaska of guidelines for determining the public
interest nature of a claim. The impact of uncertainty also reaches
the level of attorney counseling. Perhaps the most revealing aspect
of the ill effects of this uncertainty is the continued assertion of pub-
lic interest status by Alaska litigants. With some elucidation of the
important considerations behind the public interest exception, in
light of the facts and circumstances of a given case, this unnecessary
waste of resources can be curtailed and public interest litigation can
be effectively encouraged.
Virginia Cella Antlolo
66. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82(a).
67. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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